cmcee.org blog

March 17, 2009

WildFilmHistory.org – A Review

The WildFilmHistory.org site offers a remarkable set of resources for anyone who wants to learn about the history of wildlife filmmaking. However, the nature media have developed a very particular way of representing nature which tends to be promoted as being the way of representing nature, ie., ‘nature itself’. With two partial exceptions, the archive takes almost no critical distance from this dynamic.

By Nils Lindahl Elliot

The WildFilmHistory.org website offers an archive of natural history filmmaking: in the website’s own words, the site offers an ‘online guide to the pioneering people and landmark productions behind one hundred years of wildlife filmmaking’ with ‘ground-breaking films, “behind the scenes” photographs, essential production information, and specially crafted learning resources, as well as a unique collection of personal memoirs from key industry players’(1).

The following review introduces the institutional context within which WildFilmHistory has been generated. It then describes the structuring of the site from a practical, user-oriented perspective. It concludes by offering a discursive analysis of WildFilmHistory.

1. About Wildscreen

Let us begin with a brief institutional contextualisation of the website. Wildfilmhistory.org is the result of an initiative of a British non-profit organisation called Wildscreen. Wildscreen’s official remit is to ‘promote an appreciation of biodiversity and nature through the power of wildlife imagery’(2). The organisation is at once an expression of, and a key agent for, the formalisation of a field of interaction (3) constituted by the practices of wildlife TV producers, and of the organisations that commission their work and/or support their filmmaking.

Wildscreen began as the organiser of Bristol’s Wildscreen Festival, a biennial trade show in which natural history filmmakers talk shop, award prizes for the best natural history documentaries, and engage in a variety of activities that promote the public image of the field. In time, Wildscreen has acquired additional functions; one of these involves the establishment of public archives of the nature media’s TV programmes, and WildFilmHistory.org is one such archive.

As noted earlier, the website makes available a variety of historic materials relating to the production of natural history documentaries. Like all archives, WildFilmHistory not only makes available certain resources, but organises and presents them in a particular way. The present review offers an analysis of the latter aspects.

2. A Tour of WildFilmHistory

The structuring of the archive is simple, but effective: WildFilmHistory allows its users to obtain textual, or multi-mediated materials in one of four basic categories:

  • the historic film clips themselves, which can be accessed by name, or by date;
  • brief biographies of filmmakers, whose names are archived in alphabetical order;
  • ‘oral histories’, which are videotaped interviews with about 30 figures in the above mentioned films, and which can either be played onscreen, or read via a PDF-based transcription;
  • and finally, a list of ‘key events’, which is essentially a timeline of selected events in the history of wildlife filmmaking.

The various entries are illustrated with a collection of still images. This collection is itself a valuable resource. The various aspects of the archive can be accessed in one of three ways: via a browsing list on the homepage; via the banner; or via a useful search function. The fact that the collection is web-based means that the omnipresent Google can also be used to search for entries.

Unfortunately, the four categories listed above do not offer the possibility of searching via subcategories; for example, one cannot ask for a listing of photographers or camerapersons, and one cannot request a listing of all films about, say, the Serengeti. The search function can of course be used for either request, but it will simply list every item in the website that includes the search term, however incidentally.

That said, the four categories listed above do include clickable cross-referencing, which means for example that if the entry on David Attenborough mentions, amongst other series, The Private Life of Plants, then users can click on the title to go that series. There is also a column on the right-hand side of each biographical entry which lists any available film clips, and oral histories produced by or with that person.

The quantity and quality of the entries varies considerably. This is arguably to be expected in so far as there may be more or less information available about one or another producer; and in so far as the archive may have procured varying numbers of clips for viewing. As the user goes through the various biographical entries, it is nevertheless apparent that WildFilmHistory is still very much a project in the making. Many of the biographical entries have no more than a photograph of the person in question—presumably such entries are still under construction. There are also some names which don’t appear on the list, but which have made their mark in the field: to name just two examples, the contemporary producer, Mike Linley; and Étienne-Jules Marey, who was arguably as important to early early filmmaking as was Edweard Muybridge.

Of course, anyone determined enough can always find one or another entry that ‘ought’ to have been included in an archive such as this. What is more interesting from the point of view of this review is the fact that the archive gives no account of its own logic of selection. It would be absurd to suppose that any archive is an entirely rational endeavour with an exact logic that can be traced via each and every document. But the opposite argument can and must be made: no archive is ever a purely arbitrary selection of materials, and so it would be good to have some kind of page that explains in some detail what the curating team was trying to achieve, what constraints they faced, some of the known limitations, and so forth.

3. On the discourse of WildFilmHistory

Let us give credit where credit is due: the WildFilmHistory.org site offers a remarkable set of resources for anyone who wants to learn about the history of wildlife filmmaking. It is clear that an enormous amount of work has gone into the project, and the result is a website that makes readily available a number of fascinating cinematographic/ televisual clips, as well as quite a lot of useful information about the filmmakers. The oral history project is innovative, and as noted earlier, the collection of stills is also significant. Given these strengths, it is to be hoped that the limitations mentioned in the previous section of this review reflect the newness of the project, and perhaps also the finite nature of the resources that can be devoted to what is potentially a very expensive venture. In time, and given further funding, WildFilmHistory will perhaps develop into an even more interesting and complete archive.

What will be more difficult to address unless there is a sea change at Wildscreen will be the conceptual or discursive limitations of the archive. As noted at the beginning of this review, any archive is, as archive, at once a matter of a collection of certain ‘contents’, but also, a matter of a certain logic of selection and combination, or what might be described as a social dynamic of classification and framing (4). Put differently, any archive reflects not just the personal perspectives of its curator(s), but also, the codes and discourses of the institutional contexts that they work in. In the case of WildFilmHistory, the context in question is the one associated with Wildscreen, but more generally, with the organisations and the field of interaction that I described earlier as the ‘nature media’.

This review is not the place for a detailed account of the nature media, their strengths and limitations (5). It suffices to note that the nature media have developed a very particular way of representing nature, one which is nonetheless promoted as being the way of representing nature, ie., ‘nature itself’ (6). With two partial exceptions, the archive takes almost no critical distance from this dynamic. The two exceptions are some of the comments made by some of the filmmakers interviewed in the oral histories; and a learning resource which is titled ‘Ethics in wildlife filmmaking’. In the former case, some of the filmmakers refer to the commercial pressures they face (see for example, the comments made during the oral history with Andrew Buchanan). In the latter case, a Powerpoint presentation lists a number of the technical ways in which the documentaries take what might be described as ‘poetic license’ in order to achieve certain audio-visual effects. These range from the somewhat dubious use of editing continuity effects, to the unacknowledged substitution of captive animals for wild animals.

While welcome, these exceptions are somewhat marginal thanks to their location in the archive. Anyone wanting to obtain a critical perspective would have to troll through reams of transcripts, and/or download the sizable Powerpoint file. But more importantly, anyone who does so would still not find a truly reflective, and ideologically critical take on the misleading notion that the documentaries merely ‘show what there is to save’; or on the direct and indirect ways in which commercial imperatives structure the filmmaking of a field which is nonetheless regarded as being a form of science communication, or an instance of public service broadcasting.

What the user will find instead is a celebration of the field, and its many notable achievements. Certainly there is much to celebrate; a significant part of the success of the nature media undoubtedly lies in the extraordinary skills of the filmmakers, and the resources which their organisations have managed to both attract, and deploy in the representation of wildlife. Given this selfsame success, it is a shame that WildFilmHistory has not been structured in a manner that is more critical of the above mentioned issues.

This could have been achieved in at least two ways: first, by using some of the existing research about the representation of nature in modern culture to develop narratives that offer deeper historical perspectives on the social, cultural and of course economic motivations of the existing forms of filmmaking. Such narratives might be developed in short clips, in standalone webpages, in Powerpoint presentations, or indeed, by asking more probing questions with the producers themselves. Another alternative might have been more interviews with scholars who can offer truly critical perspectives. While the references to Derek Bousé are welcome, several other scholars might also have been referenced; some of the names that come to mind are Jane Arthurs, Barbara Crowther, Gail Davies, Meryl Aldridge, or Simon Cottle. A much longer list might be suggested if one goes beyond natural history filmmaking sensu stricto to consider a variety of cultural issues pertaining to the social representation of animals.

Of course, some of the critical perspectives might raise hackles amongst some producers, and might also require additional funding in order to be obtained. If the latter problem is the more important one, then a second alternative would be to at least direct users to alternative perspectives via annotated bibliographies, via bibliographical comments in the biographical entries, or next to some of the cinematic entries. These (or other similar steps) would alert users about some of the deeper ethical issues raised by the filmmaking practice. They might also help to develop the site into an arena where the producers themselves might find a genuinely critical space in which to reflect on the past, and so innovate in the future.

Notes

1) http://www.wildfilmhistory.org/index.php, accessed 13 March 2009.
2) see the Wildscreen website’s home page at http://www.wildscreen.org.uk/, accessed 13 March 2009.
3) Bourdieu, P. (1990) The Logic of Practice, translated by R. Nice. Cambridge: Polity Press.
4) Bernstein, B. (1990) The Structuring of Pedagogic Discourse. London: Routledge.
5) See for example Lindahl Elliot, N. (2006) Mediating Nature. London: Routledge International Library of Sociology. See also, Lindahl Elliot, N. (2009) Observing Wildlife on Barro Colorado Island: Environmental Education and the Challenges of Transmediation, forthcoming
6) For an account of this dynamic in the natural history documentaries themselves, see the cmcee.org blog entry titled ‘Showing to Save? A Critique of Natural History Documentaries on Television’ at http://cmcee.wordpress.com/2008/02/01/showing-to-save-a-critique-of-natural-history-documentaries-part-1/

Copyright © 2009 Nils Lindahl Elliot All Rights Reserved. The following is the bibliographical information for anyone wishing to cite this text:

Lindahl Elliot, N. (2009) ‘WildFilmHistory.org – A Review’. Bristol: Centre for Media, Culture & Environmental Education.

This review is part of a new section of the cmcee.org website.

November 13, 2008

‘Romantic Red’ and the Claims of Evolutionary Psychologists

Is it the ’science of attraction’, or is it the ‘attraction of science’?

by Nils Lindahl Elliot

Every so often the news media come up with a headline that suggests that scientists have proven that some social stereotype—or what might be described more generally as an ideological relation—is a matter of nature, that is to say, of our ‘natural’ biology. Sexism seems to be a particularly attractive ideology. In the BBC alone, the following are some of the headlines that have appeared over the last few years: ‘“Hormonal” women most attractive’; ‘Attraction “determined by walk”’; ‘Slim waist holds sway in history’; and ‘Hourglass figure fertility link’. It would appear, in this sense, that there is a ’symbiotic’ relationship between a group of psychologists engaged in what is often described ‘the science of attraction’, and some media editors who apparently are willing to publicise whatever ’science of attraction’ is sent their way. In such cases it would seem that ‘sex sells’, as combined with ‘science must be true’, is irresistibly attractive—I’m tempted to say, tongue in cheek, ‘biologically attractive’—to some journalists. The result is a dynamic that may well develop and sustain rather disturbing conceptions—ideological conceptions—of the nature of sexuality.

A week ago a number of different news media carried the latest installment of this kind of story, and in this essay I would like to offer an analysis that explains why we should treat most, if not all such stories with the deepest skepticism.

In the installment in question, the BBC news online claimed that ‘Wearing red boosts attraction’ and this was followed by a series of equally extraordinary statements:

‘Women who don a little red dress before going out with a man may find their date more attentive and generous, according to scientists.’ ‘Men said they would spend more money on a woman pictured in red, compared with the same woman wearing a blue shirt.’‘Experts say that red signals ovulation or attractiveness in other species.’And ‘The researchers say that their study is clear evidence that the colour red makes men feel more amorous – even if this is only on a subconscious level’(1).

Part of the power of such statements is that they combine tacit appeals to what seems like good common sense with the authority of science: ‘the researchers say’, ‘there is clear evidence’, ‘according to the scientists’,'experts say…’ and so forth. This would appear to be a win-win situation for everyone: the journalists can claim that they are reporting on scientific findings, a practice which is likely to be especially lauded by those who want to see more ‘educational contents’ or ‘high culture’ in the media; a real or imagined public can learn about research that might have a direct bearing on their everyday lives; and of course, the scientists might well get a career boost by being able to boast that their research has ‘made headlines’. In fact, such coverage is actually a ‘lose-lose’ situation for at least two groups: the members of the public that get conned into thinking that human sexuality is hard-wired to our ‘biological heritage’; and whatever social group ends up being objectified by any ‘ism’ that is allegedly ‘proven’ by the scientists: racism, ethnocentrism, or in this case, sexism.

After seeing all the media coverage, I decided to acquire the original essay from the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (Andrew J. Elliot & Daniela Niesta’s ‘Romantic red: red enhances men’s attraction to women’). What I read confirmed my fears: the research was sociobiological in its orientation, and engaged in the kind of quasi-scientific reasoning that is so often the hallmark of the type of psychology in question.

* * *

Let us begin this critique with the basics. Sociobiology refers to the members of a de facto movement that includes the scientists and social scientists who employ positivist research methods in an effort to demonstrate that one or another aspect of human social practice is biologically determined. The movement includes such household names as Desmond Morris (The Naked Ape), Richard Dawkins (The Blind Watchmaker) and more recently, Robert (Lord) Winston, the doctor and TV presenter who fronted The Human Instinct and several other BBC series. Perhaps its most widely admired advocate, and arguably the founder of the movement, is the renowned myrmecologist, E.O. Wilson (Sociobiology and On Human Nature), who summed up the movement’s discourse when he told another sociobiologist (Steven Pinker) that ‘everything that’s in the body, including the brain and the action of the mind, is obedient to the laws of physics and chemistry as we understand it[sic]’. According to Wilson, ‘there is a unity of the sciences’—a ‘consilience’ —‘through a network of cause and effect explanations in physics, biology and even the lower reaches of the social sciences.’ In the same interview, Wilson suggested that he is intent on conducting a re-examination of ‘the basic theory and contents of sociobiology, beginning with insects and eventually coming back to humans’(2).

If we adopt a sufficiently cosmic perspective, this must be a valid perspective. Think, for a moment, of the sheer vastness of the universe. Then think of the minute time and space that we humans occupy in that universe. Does it not make good sense to say that the differences between an ant and a human are insignificant when considered in the context of such an incomprehensibly vast space and time? And, given the verity of this observation, should we not also accept that we humans must be subject to the kinds of forces described by what Wilson refers to as a ‘network of cause and effect explanations’?

On one level of analysis—the level or perspective defined by the sociobiologists themselves—the answers to all of the above questions must be affirmative. Indeed, some would perhaps argue that it is dangerous to contradict the sociobiological logic at a time when religious fundamentalists the world over are arguably doing their best to return us to what might eventually become a form of theocracy. Not all sociobiologists oppose science and religion, but I hope I’m right when I say that sociobiologists sharply (and rightly) oppose the kind of literal interpretation of the Bible that would have our forebears munching on illicit apples in pretty gardens just a few thousand years ago.

The problem is that the level of analysis determined by many if not most sociobiologists is fundamentally biased when it comes to explaining humans—biased in favour of a biologically determinist world view, and a positivist conception of science. Move beyond either of these ‘isms’, and zoom in on the different species a bit, and you will suddenly find that, actually, we humans are quite different from ants, and that maybe we should use rather different forms of explanation to account for many, if not most aspects of each other’s behaviour.

* * *

Let us go back to ‘Romantic Red’. Those who have studied and critiqued sociobiology (as applied to humans) over the years will soon recognise a familiar modus operandi in the research of Elliot and Niesta. A detailed account of this pattern would transform this already long essay into a very long essay, so I will try to be brief. If the mentioned modus operandi can be summed up as a series of ’stages’, then the following is a sketch of the stages.

The first stage involves choosing some social practice to research. It could be any social practice, but many sociobiologists tend to choose practices that involve social stereotypes, and/or some form of social objectification–one infamous example involved trying to ‘prove’ that Blacks are indeed ‘less intelligent’ than Whites. In the case of Elliot and Niesta, the subject chosen for analysis is what they describe as the hypothesis that ‘red leads men to view women as more attractive and more sexually desirable. Red is hypothesized to serve as an aphrodisiac for men because it carries the meaning of sex and romance in the context of heterosexual interaction’(3). This choice means that, from the outset, the researchers have adopted the predominant, conventional, and homocentric stance regarding matters of sexual attraction: even if the focus is ostensively on men, the ultimate object of research is arguably the reception of the biology, or what is represented as the biology, of women.

I will return to the fateful character of this choice below. Here it is more important to note that the second stage in sociobiological research of this kind typically involves deciding, mainly if not entirely on the basis of circumstantial evidence, that the practice to be researched is ‘universal’. Doing so is a prerequisite for a biologically determinist discourse: if it’s ‘natural’, it must be ‘universal’ to humans (unless, of course, one subscribes to a racist view of humans, which some sociobiologists do).

In the case of Elliot and Niesta’s essay, the hypothesis is justified in a manner that reminded me of Jorge Luis Borges’ famous reference to a ‘Chinese’ [sic] encyclopaedia. I quote in its entirety the passage with the ‘evidence’ of the ‘universal’ nature of what the authors describe as ‘societal use of red’:

‘In some of the earliest rituals known to anthropologists, red ochre was used as face and body paint on females to symbolize the emergence of fertility (Knight, Powers, & Watts, 1995; Kohn, 1999; Lee, 2006). Red often appears as a symbol of passion, lust, and fertility in ancient mythology and folklore (Barua, 1962; Erdoes & Ortiz, 1984; Hupka, Zaleski, Otto, Reidl, & Tarabrina, 1997; Hutchings, 2004; Jobes, 1962). In literature, red has repeatedly been associated with female sexuality, especially illicit sexuality, most famously in Nathaniel Hawthorne’s classic work The Scarlet Letter. Likewise, in popular stage and film, there are many instances in which red clothing, especially a red dress, has been used to represent passion or sexuality (e.g., A Streetcar Named Desire, Dial M for Murder, and Jezebel; Greenfield, 2005). Red is paired with hearts on Valentine’s Day to symbolize romantic affection and is a highly popular color for women’s lingerie. Red has been used for centuries to signal sexual availability or “open for business” in red-light districts. Women commonly use red lipstick and rouge to heighten their attractiveness, a practice that has been in place at least since the time of the ancient Egyptians (10,000 BCE; Regas & Kozlowski, 1998)’(4).

Societal use of red, indeed. The above paragraph is an excellent illustration of the kind of poor common sense that sociobiologists frequently muster to defend what tends to be, from the start, little more than a universalising discourse. If this is the kind of ‘evidence’ that the research is based on, then every other aspect of the research must be suspect. The point is not to deny that a certain association between ‘red’—a huge and by no means unproblematic category or abstract singular(5)—and sexuality might be present in more than one cultural context. The point is that if one is going to make the kinds of universal claims that the authors make, it had better be based on much, much stronger evidence. And a key aspect of this must involve a far closer, and contextual analysis of the possible meanings of different uses of different reds in, and across, cultural contexts.

The third stage is to suggest that the practice in question is ultimately a function of nature, i.e. of a biology conceived in opposition to, or at least as transcending, contemporary social practice. This operation involves an exceedingly slippery politics. One the one hand, the research effectively seeks to reduce social practice to its ostensibly ‘natural’ causes; in effect, the ’social’ becomes no more than a kind of continuous ‘function’ of the biological. But at the same time, sociobiologists cannot help but oppose culture and nature on the level of their own discourse. I noted this contradiction in the work of E.O. Wilson himself in my book Mediating Nature (see pp. 19-20). Amongst other philosophers, Kate Soper has done an excellent job of revealing the extent to which the nature-culture opposition remains a tacit, if much reviled aspect of modern discourses about the nature of nature. As she puts it, ‘Whether… it is claimed that “nature” and “culture” are clearly differentiated realms or that no hard and fast delineation can be made between them, all such thinking is tacitly reliant on the humanity-nature antithesis itself and would have no purchase on our understanding without it’ (6). One of the philosophical problems of sociobiology is that many of its advocates try, discursively speaking, to have it both ways: in the interview mentioned earlier, Wilson, for example, makes the case that we humans are little different from ants, but in his very beautifully written book, The Diversity of Life, he himself speaks of ‘the nonhuman world’(7).

In the case of ‘Romantic Red’, the authors have no sooner made a common sense case for universal ‘societal uses of red’, than they engage in a similar form of argumentation to suggest that the ‘red-sex link’ is a matter of our ‘biological heritage’:

‘Although it is possible that the red–sex link is a product of societal conditioning alone, there is reason to believe that it may also have roots in our biological heritage. Many nonhuman female primates display red on their genitals, perineum, chest, or face when nearing ovulation (Dixson, 1983; Gerald, 2003; Hrdy & Whitten, 1987; Setchell, Wickings, & Knapp, 2006). This reddening of the skin is due to elevated estrogen (relative to progesterone) levels; increased estrogen enhances vascular blood flow under the skin surface that is manifested as red coloration (Dixson & Herbert, 1977). In some species, these displays are highly conspicuous, such as the exaggerated red swelling of the perineum in baboons, chimpanzees, and macaques, whereas in other species these displays are far less prominent, as in the slight reddening of the vulva in gibbons, gorillas, and strepsirhines (Barelli, Heistermann, Boesch, & Reichard, 2007; Sillen-Tullberg & Moller, 1993). The precise function of red coloration in female primates, both across species and across various manifestations, remains a matter of debate (Nunn, 1999; Setchell & Wickings, 2004; Stallman & Froehlich, 2000), but there is widespread consensus that it represents a sexual signal designed to attract mates (Deschner, Heistermann, Hodges, & Boesch, 2004). Research has shown that male primates are indeed particularly attracted to female conspecifics exhibiting red, as indicated by increased masturbation and copulation attempts (Bielert, Girolami, & Jowell, 1989; Waitt, Gerald, Little, & Krasielburd, 2006)’[8].

Several aspects of this argument are worth deconstructing. The authors accept that, as they put it, ‘the red–sex link’ may be ‘a product of societal conditioning alone’. But note that the expression arguably has the paradoxical function of normalizing what has by no means been proven, viz. that there is a universal ‘societal’ ‘red-sex link’. Note also that the authors acknowledge, albeit in passing, that not all nonhuman female primates display red on their genitals, perineum, chest, or face when nearing ovulation. They also acknowledge that ‘the precise function of red coloration in female primates, both across species and across various manifestations, remains a matter of debate’. Yet this counter-evidence is, in effect, swept under the carpet of the following suggestions: first, that there is in fact a ‘consensus’ in favour of a definite ‘red-sex link’ in primates; and second, that there is additional evidence that ‘male primates are indeed particularly attracted to female conspecifics exhibiting red (Witcher, Campbell, & Green, 1998)’.

As far as I can tell, the authors’ own arguments suggest that, in the best of cases, the evidence for a ‘red-sex link’ amongst nonhuman primates is ambiguous. The implication, as we are invited to read on about humans’ biology, is nonetheless that we humans ‘also’ have such a link, albeit a less conspicuous one:

‘For human females, ovulation is not advertised in a conspicuous manner, but researchers are beginning to document the presence of subtle physiological, psychological, and behavioral markers of reproductive status. As with other female primates, women’s estrogen–progesterone ratio is elevated near ovulation, which enhances blood flow (Fortney et al., 1988; Lynn, McCord, & Halliwell, 2007). In addition, women’s general skin tone lightens mid-cycle (Van den Berghe & Frost, 1986), and women near ovulation tend to wear clothing that leaves more skin visible (Grammer, Renninger, & Fischer, 2005; Haselton, Mortezaie, Pillsworth, Bleske-Rechek, & Fredrick, 2007). Furthermore, women at mid-cycle report more sexual interest and are more easily sexually aroused (Bullivant et al., 2004; Slob, Bax, Hop, Rowland, & van der Werflen Bosch, 1996), meaning the red blush of flirtation (on the face, neck, and upper chest; Eibl-Eiblsfeldt, 1989; Keltner & Buswell, 1997) and the red flush of sexual excitation (which begins on the lower chest and spreads to the upper chest, neck, and face as excitation increases; Katchadourian, 1984) are more prevalent at this time. As such, it is likely that women, like other female primates, display red more often and more prominently when nearing ovulation. We also think it reasonable to posit that men, like their more primitive male relatives, are predisposed to interpret a display of red by a female conspecific as a sexual signal and to respond accordingly’(9).

Here again, the paragraph begins by admitting that in humans, female ovulation is not advertised in a conspicuous manner. Pursued to its logical conclusion, this point alone might bring the scaffolding for any biologically determinist interpretation of the ‘red-sex link’ crashing down. Instead, the authors pursue the evidence, if it can be called that, of ‘subtle’ changes associated with human ovulation. Several of the changes seem to be based on unhelpful generalisations in their own right: for example, what is the relevance to the argument that there is ‘a lightening of skin tone’? To be sure, does such a lightening happen to all women, and would it be perceptible in all women? Is it really the case that all women near ovulation (‘near ovulation’?) ‘wear clothing that leaves more skin visible’ in all contexts? Does ‘sexual interest’ or even ‘sexual arousal’ automatically lead to a ‘red blush of flirtation’ (or to reverse the order, does flirtation always involve a red blush)? And is any such blush really ’subtle’? If one is going to use such terms in the context of a positivist epistemology, one had better develop pretty discrete and measurable categories (to be clear, I’m not arguing in favour of such categories; I am simply picking up where the authors’ own use of positivism has significant problems.)

To return to the researchers’ argument: even after the authors admit that women don’t have the kind of conspicuous changes associated with some primates, they seem to suggest that women do, in effect, become red, or at any rate, redder during ovulation: ‘As such, it is likely that women, like other female primates, display red more often and more prominently when nearing ovulation(emphasis added)’. Eh? As far as I can tell, either there is a contradiction here—are humans like other primates, or aren’t they?— or the authors need to develop a theory of tacit, unconscious, or unselfconscious ‘displays’.

Towards the end of the section that justifies the hypothesis, Elliot and Niesta bring together the two theoretical houses of cards in one sweeping statement, the italicized aspect of which establishes a typically sociobiological hierarchy, and order of priority:

‘In sum, red is clearly linked to sex in the context of heterosexual interaction, and this link is viewed as emerging from both societal use of red and a biologically engrained predisposition to red. These two sources may contribute to the red–sex link in joint fashion. That is, we posit that the societal use of red is not random, but actually derives from the biologically based predisposition to perceive red as a sexual signal. For example, the aforementioned use of red lipstick and rouge may represent, at least in some instances, an attempt to mimic the vascularization present during ovulation and sexual excitation (Low, 1979). Likewise, red may be used in red-light districts because it is the color that appears on the sexually aroused female body (not only in the publicly visible sexual flush, but, more intimately, in the engorgement of the labia minora; Luria, Friedman, & Rose, 1987). As these examples illustrate, the societal use of red can be seen as not only reinforcing the inherent meaning of red, but also as extending the application of this meaning beyond the tether of natural bodily processes’(italics added, 10).

The next stage in the sociobiological modus operandi is usually to ‘prove’ the hypothesis by way of the hypothetico-deductive method, i.e. employing one or more experiments designed to enable the experimenter to deduce whether some universal ‘law’ is valid or not.

In the case of ‘Romantic Red’, there is clearly nothing like a ‘law’ to be proven. But the manner in which the ‘proof’ itself is conducted is revealing. In this post I will merely mention one particularly glaring deficiency: it might be assumed that a research project involving a huge claim regarding the universality of the ‘red-sex link’ would involve thousands, if not tens of thousands of research subjects spanning cultures across the globe. Instead, the researchers use 27 ‘male undergraduates in the United States’ for the first experiment; 63 male and female undergraduates for the second experiment; 37 male undergraduates for the third experiment; and 31 male undergraduates for the fourth experiment. More than the tiny numbers—given the universality of the claims—what is striking is the sociological, to not say statistical naiveté of the researchers, and presumably of those who conducted any peer review of the essay. Do they really believe that 181 members of a relatively homogeneous social group—young people, all of them presumably studying in the same university—can be used to make such huge claims about the ‘red-sex link’? (I say 181, but the number might actually have been a lot lower if some of the respondents were allowed to participate in more than one experiment; to be sure, the claims of the research are arguably as good as any one of the experiments, in which a maximum of 37 male respondents participated.)

* * *

I think I’ve said enough about the logic of the research to show just how seriously flawed it is. Let us now move on to consider to what happened to the research after it was published in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. This is typically the next, and ‘final’ stage in this kind of research: as noted earlier, many sociobiologists seem to be very good at getting the news media to publicise their research; or at least, many seem to be very good at producing research that appeals to some of the news media. This step is crucial because it ensures that the research acquires a salience that it wouldn’t attain otherwise. And with that salience there arguably comes power—potentially, academic promotion, but also, a certain cultural authority that goes with wide social recognition. The point is not to criticise Elliot and Niesta for seeking a wider audience for their research, if indeed they were at all involved in the publicity (PR departments in universities frequently take over this process, and academics don’t necessarily control how their research is promoted or recontextualized). In the case of ‘Romantic Red’, it is nevertheless possible to see how the two dimensions (the research, and its representation) came together in a way that might well facilitate sexual objectification, i.e. what is commonly known as sexism.

On the one hand, the research sets out to prove, in effect, that what matters most in sexual attraction is the biology of women, as perceived by men. There is arguably a double whammy at work here: not only is the explanatory focus on women’s biology, but men are tacitly portrayed as the ones that do the perceiving of, or gazing upon, that biology.

On the other hand, the BBC article not only echoes this standpoint, but amplifies and extends it: red becomes a ‘booster’ for sexual attraction—full stop—and somehow, a ‘little red dress’ becomes a part of the equation. For good measure—and this is an aspect that the authors themselves have put into their research methodology—it is claimed that wearing red will also get the men to spend more money on the women. All other mediating aspects are eliminated, in favour of just one ‘factor’: wearing red, or rather, women wearing red. In a seemingly effortless recombination, sexual objectification and capitalism are made mixed, matched, and legitimised. What matters, or so the article suggests, as ‘backed up’ by the research, is for the woman to make herself sexually attractive by way of red, and this will ensure that the money and the ‘amorous feelings’ get going. Thank god (and/or complex evolutionary processes) that life is not so simple.

* * *

I can well imagine what the sociobiologists’ rejoinder might be: are you suggesting that our biology is not an important aspect of sexual attraction? No; of course it is important. The problem emerges when certain social and cultural aspects are ignored; or when the social aspects are reduced to little more than a natural function of an ‘underlying’ biology, a ‘biological heritage’. This is what is known as methodological functionalism at its worst. If the power of the social aspects is ignored, or if false claims are made about the power of ‘nature’, and such claims are then taken to be an ‘objective truth’, then someone is likely to end up being misled, if not disempowered. After all, it is widely assumed that what is ‘natural’ cannot be changed. In the case of ‘Romantic Red’, what is, by the authors’ own admission, potentially ‘a product of societal conditioning [sic] alone’, is in the end reduced to a matter of biology: ‘we posit that the societal use of red is not random, but actually derives from the biologically based predisposition to perceive red as a sexual signal.’ In the paper’s conclusion the authors further state that

‘The practical implications of our findings are striking in the extent of their reach. That red is an aphrodisiac for men is not only valuable information for both men and women in the mating game, but should also prove of considerable interest to fashion and image consultants, product designers, and marketers and advertisers, among (many) others. Given the subtlety of the effect (men show little awareness of it) and the ease with which the effect may be evoked (via a 5-s glimpse of red), it is easy to imagine red having a widespread influence in daily life’(emphasis added, 11).

Easy to imagine, but not so easy to prove: the authors belatedly recognise towards the end of their essay that further research might need to consider the social context. With some effort, a case might be made that the journalists should have noted this in the recontextualisation of the research. This, however, is somewhat disingenuous. On the one hand, the entire research methodology and epistemology is biased in favour of biological determinism. On the other hand, it is not exactly a secret that many journalists tend to accentuate and caricature much of the science that they popularise. In the context of a society that arguably remains deeply if subtly sexist, it is hardly surprising that the BBC reporter(s) have not only reproduced the biologically determinist and universalizing orientation of the research, but have actually extended its claims: as noted earlier, it is not only that ‘Wearing red boosts attraction’—a headline that might lead men to start wearing red shirts!—but also that ‘Women who don a little red dress before going out with a man may find their date more attentive and generous, according to scientists’ (BBC, as per the earlier quote).

Earlier, I mentioned that sociobiology, as applied to humans, is premised on a positivist epistemology. This is perhaps the most grievous aspect of the research design. Despite the authors’ early suggestions to the contrary, the research continues to be haunted by its reliance on what one scholar has described as the ‘rule of phenomenalism’(12)—simplifying somewhat, the notion that essences are no different from phenomena, or, put even more simply, that any given practice is more or less unidimensional in the sense that its meaning is fixed. ‘Romantic Red’ arguably constitutes a de facto return to the rule of phenomenalism in so far as it effectively tries to affix the meaning of ‘red’ to an allegedly biological function—a function which either transcends, or is itself expressed by, any social practice. Such a fixing—in every sense of the word—is potentially dynamite from the point of view of sexual politics. I have noted elsewhere the way in which modern institutions have silently humanized ‘nature’ only to project the humanized nature back onto cultural groups via procedures of cosmomorphism (see Mediating Nature, p. 42ff). Such a circuit of anthropomorphism and cosmomorphism might well be one of the consequences of ‘Romantic Red’. What chance, one might ask, does a more liberated, and progressive sexual politics have if many men and women believe, on the back of this kind of research, that when it comes to sex—or at least ’sex’ as it relates to ‘red’—we are no more (and no less) than gibbons, macaques or chimpanzees? The problem is not to twist science in favour of a certain sexual politics, but rather to make sure that a certain science does not end up twisting our sexual politics.

References

(1) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/7693708.stm, accessed November 5, 2008. The research attracted the attention of several other news media. See for example, the Los Angeles Times coverage at http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/booster_shots/2008/10/color-red-is-an.html.
(2) in http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/wilson03/wilson_print.html, accessed November 5, 2008.
(3) Elliot, A.J. & Niesta, D. (2008] ‘Romantic red: red enhances men’s attraction to women’ in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95(5): 1150-1164, p. 1150.
(4) Elliot & Niesta Op. Cit., p. 1151.
(5) Williams, R. (1983) Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. Revised edition. London: Fontana.
(6) Soper, K. (1995) What is Nature? Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 15.
(7) Wilson, E.O. (1992) The Diversity of Life. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, p. 9.
[8] Elliot & Niesta Op. Cit., p. 1151.
(9) Elliot & Niesta Op. Cit., p. 1151.
(10) Elliot & Niesta Op. Cit., p. 1151.
(11) Elliot & Niesta Op. Cit., p. 1161.
(12) Kolokowski, L. (1972) Positivist philosophy : from Hume to the Vienna Circle / Leszek Kolakowski translated [from the Polish] by Norbert Guterman.

Copyright © 2008 Nils Lindahl Elliot All Rights Reserved

March 25, 2008

About the Mass Media and Environmental Activism

Even if environmentalist groups’ aims, objectives and methods have often been misrepresented by the news media, the relationship between the two sets of organisations is best described as a matter of ‘co-evolution’

by Nils Lindahl Elliot

In a recent article in the Guardian, George Monbiot described the London Evening Standard’s representation of last summer’s environmental protest at Heathrow Airport (1). According to Monbiot, the paper’s journalist, Rashid Razaq, presented as fact false allegations that the protestors were planning to plant hoax suspicious packages in the airport’s terminal, and that they were planning to mount an assault on the airport perimeter. What began, and indeed remained throughout as a peaceful protest ended up being framed as a kind of ‘green terrorism’.

Environmental educators will know that there is a long history of such representations of environmental activism. At the time that she was writing Silent Spring in the early 1960s, Rachel Carson was very aware that she had to be extraordinarily cautious when it came to presenting her groundbreaking evidence about the harmful effects of DDT and other pesticides. According to Carson biographer Linda Lear, Carson told a friend that ‘They are such powerful adversaries: the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the business empires and the ever-increasing practice of monoculture’(2). And indeed, after Silent Spring was published, many of the news media in the US were quite happy to reproduce the views of the National Agricultural Chemicals Association, which reportedly spent in excess of $250.000—a huge figure at the time—to try to discredit Carson. Ezra Taft Benson, a former Secretary of Agriculture and the thirteenth president of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, was even allowed to ask ‘Why a spinster with no children was so concerned about genetics’, a question which he himself answered by suggesting that Carson was ‘probably a Communist’(3). As this quote makes clear, in Carson’s time as in our own, it was all too easy to try to establish an equivalence between the actions of environmental activists, and the most reviled forces of subversion.

The Evening Standard, like the Daily Mail, is a tabloid owned by the Associated Newspapers, a media organisation that is not exactly known for the progressive character of its politics. Environmental protesters at Heathrow might thus have expected unsympathetic coverage from one or both papers. More surprising, perhaps, was the publication on March 9, 2008 of an article in the Sunday Times that effectively demolished New Labour’s case for the radical expansion of Heathrow Airport. The Sunday Times—Rupert Murdoch’s flagship broadsheet in the UK—suggested that the BAA (the privatised British Airport Authority, owned by the Spanish corporate giant Ferrovial) had ‘colluded with government officials to “fix” the evidence in favour of a new third runway at Heathrow’. The paper said that documents obtained under freedom of information laws revealed that

‘BAA gave instructions to DfT [Department for Tranport] officials on how to “strip out” data that indicated key environmental targets would be breached by the airport. The airports operator repeatedly selected alternative data used for the consultation to ensure that the final results showed a negligible impact on noise and pollution. The DfT gave BAA unprecedented access to confidential papers and allowed the company to help to rewrite the consultation document. The final document significantly reduced the likely carbon emissions caused by the runway by not including incoming international flights’(4).

While the politics behind this article may well have been rather complex (5), the article could hardly be said to be ‘anti-green’. On the contrary, the article was almost certainly a godsend to all those who had long suspected New Labour claims regarding the impact of a third runway at Heathrow. After the article was published, the Department for the Environment was effectively forced to ‘issue a leak’, and, according to the Guardian, the leak confirmed that the plans for a third runway would indeed breach the EU directives on nitrous dioxide pollution, leading to increased mortality rates across the south-east of England(6).

The article in the Sunday Times was one of several media representations that suggested a possible shift in the environmental politics of the mass media. Indeed, it would appear that something like a watershed occurred between 2004 and 2007. During this period, the news media reported on a number of increasingly confident scientific assessments regarding the validity of the thesis of human-induced climate change. The reports coincided with the relatively sudden loss of political capital amongst the British and U.S. groups that had worked the hardest to undermine the thesis of climate change, or to dissimulate its implications. But the reports also coincided with the production of several high profile, and explicitly didactic media representations such as the Hollywood blockbuster The Day After Tomorrow (2004) and Davis Guggenheim’s An Inconvenient Truth (2006). Viewed in the context of climate events such as Hurricane Katrina—which were themselves linked by some media to climate change—these and other events might well have helped to break the dam of public scepticism vis-à-vis human-induced climate change which had been built over the last decade or so.

The question that I’d like to address in this post is, do the mentioned media representations contradict the views of those environmental activists who have long assumed that the media are systematically biased against environmental protest? If they do, might it be that representations such as the Evening Standard’s are a kind of dinosaur-like ‘regression’ that will increasingly be ‘a thing of the past’?

* * *

The conventional discourse about the relationship between the mass media and environmental activism hinges on a professional code of practice that requires media producers to be impartial and objective. A good example of this discourse may be found in the BBC’s editorial guidelines, which suggest that ‘the BBC is committed to impartiality’. This means, amongst other things, that the corporation seeks to provide ‘a properly balanced service consisting of a wide range of subject matter and views broadcast over an appropriate time scale across all our output’, and to ‘reflect a wide range of opinion and explore a range and conflict of views so that no significant strand of thought is knowingly unreflected [sic] or under represented’. The Corporation aims to ‘ensure [that] we avoid bias or an imbalance of views on controversial subjects’. Its ‘journalists and presenters, including those in news and current affairs, may provide professional judgments but may not express personal opinions on matters of public policy or political or industrial controversy’ and ‘[o]ur audiences should not be able to tell from BBC programmes or other BBC output the personal views of our journalists and presenters on such matters’(7).

While some might regard the BBC as a paragon of this ethos, similar values are espoused by many if not most other mainstream news media in the UK, the U.S. and many other countries. It is interesting to note, in this sense, that even tabloid papers like the Evening Standard and the Daily Mail must at least profess an adherence to such values; failure to do so might result in action by the UK’s Press Complaints Commission, or, more seriously, by the British courts.

While guidelines such as the BBC’s shape many journalists’ conceptions of the nature of media representation, environmentalist activists have long regarded the discourse of impartiality as being at best an imperfect constraint on media ‘bias’, and at worst a smokescreen for corporate and political interests. Indeed, at the height of the green backlash that occurred after the first Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, a number of environmentalists concluded that it was necessary to reconceptualise the aforementioned ‘bias’. For example, in 1998, David Edwards wrote in The Ecologist that ‘the media is made up of large corporations all in the business of maximizing profits, all tied into the stock market. This immediately suggests that media corporations might have a tendency to be sympathetic to corporations, to the status quo and to the profit-maximizing motive of the corporate system’. While Edwards acknowledged that ‘Certainly, less damaging information will be allowed to reach the public’ and also that ‘This does not mean that the truth will be completely excluded’, he was clear that he believed that there was something like a systematic bias on the part of the media against the environmental movement(8).

In a similar article published in the New Internationalist a couple of years later, David Cromwell suggested that ‘the media are big business, tied into stock markets and the globalized economy. Media owners are wealthy people with many fingers in many business pies and are dependent on the support of advertisers. How likely is it that anyone calling for radical change in society – whether environmentalists, human-rights activists or opponents of the arms trade – will be consistently and fairly reported by corporate news organizations?’ In Cromwell’s view, Herman and Chomsky’s ‘propaganda model of media control’ (9) provided a good framework with which to interpret the media’s role vis-à-vis environmental activism: ‘Their argument is that market forces act as ‘filters’ which determine what news is ‘fit to print’. One of these filters is simply the nature of media ownership. The sheer size, concentrated ownership, immense owner wealth and quest for profit of the dominant media corporations mean that business priorities can, and do, shape editorial content’(10).

An approach such as Edwards’, Cromwell’s or indeed Herman and Chomsky’s might certainly explain aspects of representations such as the Evening Standard’s. But can it explain critical representations such as the Sunday Times’? Or indeed, can it explain the consensus that appears to have emerged amongst the news media vis-à-vis the reality of human-induced climate change?

* * *

Several issues must be taken into account by anyone who tries to reply to these questions.

A first set of issues involve the use of concepts such as ‘the media’ or ‘the environmental movement’. These may be misleading in so far as they involve what one cultural theorist has described as ‘abstract singulars’: terms which accord a single, universal, essential quality or character to an otherwise diverse group of elements (11). While no one can ever completely avoid the use of abstract singulars, and some terms such as ‘the media’ are particularly hard to avoid, a certain use of such expressions may easily lead otherwise critical observers to overlook the real heterogeneity of the institutions, genres, technologies, discourses, and representational practices that make up the media of mass communication. Any analysis must thus begin by recognising the concrete ways in which this heterogeneity occurs, and any heterodox perspectives which the heterogeneity may enable. As we near the end of the first decade of the 21st century, it may be that a combination of factors will significantly increase the scope for heterodoxy, and may yet generate some real difficulties for the groups that could perhaps once count on the almost automatic support of certain sectors of the news and other media.

A similar critique applies to ‘the environmental movement’. A Sierra Club is not the same as Reclaim the Streets, and this may mean, amongst other things, that some news organisations may have no problem with being very supportive of ‘safe’ forms of environmental discourse even as they feel compelled to suppress, or negatively frame other forms. To be sure, even ‘safe’ forms of environmental discourse may become rather less safe for media producers and for environmental activists if the representations shift from general invocations to specific accusations.

A second set of issues involves any reference to media ‘bias’, ‘objectivity’ or ‘impartiality’. As media critics have long noted, the model of media objectivity that is commonly employed to evaluate media representations is fundamentally flawed. Even if some representations may be shown to be more accurate than others—or more accurate in some ways than in others—that is quite different from suggesting that all media representations can or should be ‘balanced’, ‘objective’, let alone ‘value-free’.

There are two general reasons why at least a naive invocation of the ethos of impartiality may be misleading. On the one hand, a strong case can be made that some representations should put forward one perspective as strongly, but also as accurately, as possible. Indeed, in some circumstances a formal sense of ‘balance’ may actually distort a certain social dynamic or perspective.

On the other hand, traditional notions of objectivity tend to be based on relatively naïve understandings of the nature of the production, dissemination, and social reception of knowledge by way of the media of mass communication. Practical constraints to do with generic formulae, the amount of space or time available to produce a representation, and the political and economic interests of the media organisations and their bureaucracies are not a matter of exception. On the contrary, they are the structural conditions under which, and with which journalists and other media producers must work to produce all manner of representations. In practice, such constraints force media producers to be selective, if not reductive with respect to the range and number of points of view that they represent. Moreover, those that they do choose to represent will certainly reflect, however indirectly or subtly, the producers’ limited knowledge and/or range of experiences.

That said, on occasion the pragmatics of a certain logic of juncture may mean that unexpected alliances may form, that hitherto ‘outlandish’ perspectives may suddenly make sense, or indeed, that perpetually ostracised ‘radicals’ may at last be invited to speak. From this point of view, a socially deterministic approach to media impartiality is as problematic as one that abstracts of all manner of social constraints.

By this account, what matters is not so much that all media producers are ‘objective’ (which is not to say that the ideal should be simply discarded), but that the state and the civil society should work to ensure that there is, firstly, a significant plurality of voices producing mass media messages. Both the state and the civil society should also try to ensure that the members of a society are educated to both expect, and understand in detail the way in which such a pluralism may work, or indeed may fail to work in a particular context. If the idealising tendencies of naive forms of liberalism are to be avoided, then it is probably safe to assume that an approach such as I have just proposed is liable, indeed likely to be co-opted by some groups.

The last set of issues that I wish to consider is more difficult to present in a succinct manner. While I am sympathetic to the general critique presented by Herman and Chomsky in Manufacturing Consent, it seems to me that any account of the relationship between the mass media and environmental activism needs to adopt a historical perspective that explores not so much the disjunction or opposition between the mass media and environmental activists, as the conjunction and continuity between these two broad categories, or their representatives. A critical reading of the practices of many environmental non-government organisations (ENGOs) suggests that, despite sharp differences and antagonisms on some levels, the ‘ecological revolution’ owes at least as much to the mass media—or rather, to the process of mass mediation—as it does to the rise of something like an ecological consciousness.

This point can be illustrated with reference to the work of Rachel Carson. Carson was by no means the first person to blow the whistle on pesticides such as DDT. She was, however, arguably the first person who found a way of both compiling, and then narrativizing research about the pesticides’ hitherto unacknowledged effects on human health. As I have suggested elsewhere (12), Carson was amongst the first ‘true’ modern environmentalists in so far as she engaged in an environmental risk politics that entailed a complex, and multi-staged form of mass mediation.

A brief excursus is required to explain the last point. The first step in this process involved discovering hitherto unknown threats to an environment, or indeed, environmental threats full stop (the two are not necessarily the same). This in turn frequently required environmentalists to transgress, and effectively reclassify public/private divides in both the economic and social senses of the term. Such a transgression was required in order to find out what corporations or governments might be up to ‘behind the scenes’, that is to say, in the private or semi-private spaces of corporate or governmental practices.

But once the initial sleuth work identified any risks, perhaps the more significant aspect of 20th century forms of environmental activism began: one of the main functions, if not the main function of environmental activists was (and remains) to develop a mass-mediated pedagogy of environmental risk, viz. teaching mass audiences about the character and extent of one or another environmental risk. Doing so required the activists to cross another public/private divide, one that now involved not the state or corporate practice, but everyday life within the domestic sphere. Environmental activists had to find a way of communicating with millions of people in the privacy of their own lives and homes. It was in this space that the ‘major’ media of mass communication, and especially television, played a fundamental, indeed constitutive role in the emergence of environmentalism as we know it today.

For example, if Carson’s Silent Spring was written in a manner that was calculated to attract mass audiences, it could only really affect public opinion if it managed to bypass the largely hostile gate keepers working for the Department of Agriculture, and/or the powerful agrochemical alliance. To this end, Carson had her book serialized in the New Yorker. But crucially, she also sought sympathetic coverage in time-based media. She achieved a significant breakthrough when, on April 3, 1963, she was interviewed by the CBS Reports television programme.

During the interview, Carson was able to explain that it was now necessary to redress the balance of information regarding pesticides: ‘we have heard a great deal about their safety, but very little about their hazards’(13). As noted by Linda Lear, the dignified and quietly competent nature of Carson’s presentation contrasted sharply with that of the chemical industry’s representative, Dr. Robert White-Stevens, who, dressed in a white lab coat, suggested that ‘If man were to faithfully follow the teachings of Miss Carson, we would return to the Dark Ages, and the insects and diseases and vermin would once again inherit the earth’ (14). According to Lear, CBS estimated an audience of between 10 and 15 million viewers for its Report. Remarkably, in a news context dominated by the funding and ideology of the agribusiness—some of the corporations even sponsored television and radio programmes—the programme not only favoured Carson’s perspectives, but in effect ‘set the agenda’ for forthcoming debates. As suggested by Lear, ‘in a single evening… [the] broadcast added the environment to the public agenda’ (15).

Nearly a decade after Carson’s Silent Spring was published, Greenpeace took this logic one step further. As I explained in an earlier post (see Making a Wave), Greenpeace was not, as its founding members suggested, simply ‘bearing witness’ to environmental destruction when its began its first campaign in the Aleutian Islands. Instead, it specialised in generating contexts in which it might be ‘witnessed bearing witness’. This two-tiered mise en scène was not only essential to the success of Greenpeace’s campaigns, but also a structural aspect of the ENGO’s practices. From this perspective, Greenpeace not only ‘needed’ the mass media, but was itself engaging in a form of mass mediation. It is unsurprising, in this sense, that the organisation eventually began to engage in a form of vertical integration by acquiring the means with which to both produce, and distribute its own images and newscasts.

* * *

From the perspective I have just outlined, both ‘media endorsing’ perspectives such as the BBC’s guidelines, and ‘media sceptic’ perspectives such as Edwards’ and Cromwell’s are problematic in so far as they overlook a dynamic of mass mediation that is as integral to the practices of media organisations, sensu stricto, as it is to many ENGOs’ practices.

The perspective I have just outlined, and which I describe in historical context in Mediating Nature, invites environmental educators to reconsider dualistic conceptions of the relation between environmental activists and media organisations. But it also forces us to be rather sceptical about any suggestion that environmental activists are no more than the ‘victims’ of the kind of propagandistic media apparatus described by Herman and Chomsky. While aspects of that account are no doubt accurate, in the context of contemporary forms of environmental activism, they may lead to a simplification of what is arguably more accurately conceived as a complex, if fraught and contradictory, ‘co-evolution’.

An emphasis on the continuity between modern environmentalism and mass mediation should not, does not, imply a kind of natural progression towards the kind of consensus that I referred to earlier. On the contrary, it might well be expected that as societies move from recognising the reality of climate change to dealing with its consequences, there will be significant ideological battles over whom is forced to make what concessions as part of an on-going, and hegemonic dynamic of ‘negotiation’. As part of this process, there can be little doubt that at least some groups will either mobilize ‘their’ media, will pressure the more susceptible media organisations, and/or will indeed form alliances with media organisations to defend their interests. A case in point: an article published as recently as 2002 suggested that weathercasters in The Weather Channel and at least one other U.S. commercial channel were forbidden by their parent companies from using the term ‘global warming’ during their televised presentations. The justification for this was that any reference to global warming might put the broadcasters in ‘a very difficult political situation’(16).

To be sure, it may well be that the greatest challenge will involve not the conspiratorial abuses of the codes of media impartiality, but the sheer momentum of a political economy which continues to frame, however indirectly, even the most critical of representations. The momentum in question affects the Guardians and Independents as much as it does the Evening Standards and the Daily Mails: for example, even as the Guardian published articles such as Monbiot’s, it continued, indeed no doubt it had to continue to publish advertisements and whole sections on business and other ‘CO2-rich’ practices.

From this point of view, now as in the future, the problem may be as much to demystify the kinds of representations put out by Associated Newspapers, as to find a new modus operandi for the production, distribution, and reception of media representations more generally.

References

(1) G. Monbiot, ‘Did the Standard tell the truth about the Heathrow climate change camp?’ in Guardian, March 4, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/mar/04/associatednewspapers.pressandpublishing, accessed March 22, 2008.
(2) Carson quoted in Linda Lear (1997) Rachel Carson: Witness for Nature, New York: Henry Holt and Company, p. 388.
(3) Lear, Rachel Carson: Witness for Nature, p. 428-429
(4) ‘Revealed: the plot to expand Heathrow’ in Sunday Times, March 9, 2008, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/transport/article3512218.ece, accessed March 22, 2008.
(5) Murdoch’s News Corporation has recently sought to rebrand itself with advertisements emblazoned with the slogan ‘Free People Free Markets Free Thinking’.
(6) ‘Environment Agency joins Heathrow third runway critics’, in Guardian, March 13, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/mar/13/travelandtransport.theairlineindustry, accessed March 22, 2008.
(7) BBC Editorial Guidelines on Impartiality. http://www.bbc.co.uk/guidelines/editorialguidelines/edguide/impariality/, accessed March 22, 2008.
[8] Edwards, D. [1998] ‘Can we learn the truth about the environment from the media?’, in The Ecologist, 28(1):18-22.
(9) in their book [1998] Manufacturing Consent. New York: Pantheon.
(10) David Cromwell (2000) ‘The hack and the flack machine’ in New Internationalist, Vol. 328, http://www.newint.org/issue328/essay.htm, accessed March 22, 2008.
(11) Raymond Williams (1983) ‘Nature’, in Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. Rev. edit. London: Fontana, p. 220.
(12) Nils Lindahl Elliot (2006) Mediating Nature. London: Routledge International Library of Sociology.
(13) Lear, Rachel Carson: Witness for Nature, p. 449.
(14) White-Stevens in Lear, p. 449.
(15) Lear, p. 450.
(16) K. Wilson (2002) ‘Forecasting the Future: how television weathercasters’ attitudes and beliefs about climate change affect their cognitive knowledge on the science’, in Science Communication, 24(2):246-268, p. 251.

Copyright © 2008 Nils Lindahl Elliot All Rights Reserved

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